The man behind the Great Plan: Alfred Von Schlieffen
By Traci Morrisette.
The Man
There are hundreds of quotes that sentimentalize how a man’s legacy can narrowed down to a philosophy, idea or in the case of Alfred Graf Von Schlieffen, a plan. Schlieffen himself is not remembered in the same way as his contemporaries. Bringing up the Schlieffen Plan is likely to drive debate on tactics, plausible variations, alternate histories, but little about the actual man himself.
That said, while Schlieffen’s legacy has been consolidated largely to the master plan that he hoped would assure a German victory, it is worth understanding the man who built the blueprint that plunged the world into war. What kind of person could shape a plan, and did he understand what the consequences were. Looking back on what information we have for him, what is revealed is that Schlieffen was not a man of nefarious motivations, but believed he was doing what he was meant to do.
In terms of upbringing, Alfred Graf Von Schlieffen was one of the Prussian Junker Class, which greatly influenced his values as a future military leader. His father, Major Magnus von Schlieffen and mother Auguste von Schlieffen (nee Schonberg) raised Alfred to believe in “hierarchy, hardworking, frugality, and a firm purpose in life…” (Macmillan 2014, 339). A part of the reemerging Lutheran Protestantism church, the family had a strong belief that Christ would only save those who devoted themselves to the true teachings, such as faith, duty, and good works.
Early on in his life, Schlieffen was not naturally drawn to military service. He enrolled in the University of Berlin to study law, and enlisted as a military volunteer to fulfill the compulsory service requirement. He found this time to be satisfactory enough and ultimately enlisted as an officer candidate. Notably, Schlieffen was not known to be passionate about military service as a youth. However, it’s not hard to make an assumption that perhaps with his religious leanings and upbringing, the military life provided a means to act in the beliefs of faith, duty and purpose that were held so dear to the Schlieffens.
In 1854, he joined the 2nd Guard Uhlans as a 2nd Lieutenant - where interestingly, he earned the nickname “Crazy Schlieffen (Gorlitz 1980, 128), the result of throwing himself into some revelry as a young officer. That said, whatever frivolity he found himself in during this time, it did not detract from his commanders backing his enrollment in the General War School in 1858 despite being notably younger than most students. The backing was well placed as while he has been described as being a passionless student, he still achieved high honors upon his graduation in 1861.
From there, Schlieffen to build his career and reputation. True, he is not noted for any magnificent wins on the battlefield, but notably he served on the Truppengeneralstab (Troop General Staff), and was section chief in the Grosser Generalstab (Great General Staff). He earned multiple commendations, including an Iron Cross, First Class, in 1870 (Foley and Foley 2012, xix).
While he apparently had those moments of apparent frivolity as a younger officer, it did not rid him of the reputation of being socially withdrawn. Per Gorlitz, Schlieffen was “ a man who shut his heart up and so did not greatly savour life or derive much joy from it” (1980, 128). His heart apparently did open enough for marriage as he married his first cousin, Countess Anna Schlieffen in 1868, the same year. The marriage was a happy one, but marred with tragedy. In 1870, Schlieffen’s younger brother was killed in action and only two years later, Anna died in giving birth to the second of two daughters. Schlieffen never remarried, and after that, it seemed that passion for anything other than his military duties and studies was lost with Anna.
Following the death of his wife, Schlieffen pushed himself further into his career. Where personal happiness had eluded him, it at least seemed professional achievement was there to greet him. Indeed, during his service, he had caught the eye of the Moltke the elder, who’d been on the look out for a successor, and eventually fell into the good graces of Wilhelm II - the future Kaiser. Thus when Alfred von Waldersee made the mistake of humiliating Wilhelm II in the military games, Schlieffen’s name was immediately in the running. With his Prussian heritage, his steadfast career, his reliability and reputation of being trustworthy with responsibilities, it seemed to only make sense.
The importance of the appointment was by no means lost on Schlieffen, nor was his faith that it was his purpose to fulfill this role. “A difficult task has been given to me, yet I am imbued with the firm conviction that the lord…will not forsake me..” (MacMillan 2014, 338).
Taking Command
As Chief of the General Staff, Schlieffen lost no time in working to improve what he saw as flaws in terms of the German military preparedness. It was no secret that the Kaiser was eager for a great war to build Germany’s reputation, and preparation was a must. Additionally, he was met with the difficulty that the General Staff had lost much during the Waldersee administration. As a result, Schlieffen knew that he needed to focus on rebuilding that influence while somehow avoiding conflict with the other branches of the government. He took to heart one of Moltke’s sayings: “viel listen, wenig hervortreten - mehr sein als schienen’ - do much, but stand out little - be more than you appear (Foley and Foley 2012, xxi).
One of the biggest problems facing Schlieffen was manpower. It had become Schlieffen’s view that any war would mean facing multiple opponents, and as such, they would need a larger force to make the gains the Kaiser dearly wanted. They of course could pull men from Austria Hungary, but that would not entirely fill the gap. While Germany did have a conscription scheme, Germany was only pulling about fifty percent of German males to service versus France pulling 80 percent of eligible young men (Foley and Foley 2012, xxi). Ensuring a gain in manpower meant convincing the Minister of War, the Chancellor and the Reichstag that an increase in conscription was necessary. However, he was working against a disorganized Ministry, a Reichstag that was reluctant to increase funds to the military, and branches of government that were disordered at best.
Seeing his chances were slim for passing an increase of conscription, Schlieffen focused on steady increase in both manpower and artillery, both of which he was able to gain (both with help from the Minister of War and Kaiser Wilhem II himself). However, he was well aware that it simply was not enough if they were truly looking at a war on two fronts. Thus, he needed to turn his attention to other avenues available to him, changes that were able to increase the effectiveness of the military in terms of flexibility and fire power.
To supplement man power, heavy artillery would be needed - but transportation to the battle lines was known to be slow and arduous. The answer would lie in one of Germany’s existing innovations - the rail lines. To ensure that they could utilize the rail lines to the best advantage, he created a branch of military railroad engineers that were tasked with ensuring that the railroads close behind the front lines would be operating smoothly. (Dupuy 1977, 131). They would also help utilize captured rail lines, and if destroyed, attempt to efficiently repair them. This was not done without protest - conservatives amongst the military accused Schlieffen of sullying the noble art of war. Per Dupuy, Schlieffen likely responded to these accusations sarcastically that “war had always been dirty and grubby, and that blind adherence to custom and protective was no reason to keep from waging efficiently.” (Dupuy 1977, 132).
Meanwhile, Schlieffen had to also contend with the limits of his position. While Chief of General Staff was a crucial position, it did not provide Schlieffen with the ability to run a war as he wished - that was divided between the Ministry of War and the commanding generals. Unfortunately for Schlieffen, he found both organizations trying to deal with. Many of the generals were in opposition to his ideas. Add to that the difficulty he had with the rest of the Kaiserheer and Schlieffen was presented with few paths forward.
However, what he did realize is that he was able to influence the General Staff, and so he focused on what he could do within his own department. This was no easy task - simply being assigned the role did not mean that his peers were ready to capitulate to any of his ideas. Additionally, he had his own personal shortcomings that worked against him in this endeavor.
First, it’s not hard to guess that Schlieffen lacked the charisma and charm that many leaders of the used to their advantage. While it’s been said that he was shy and reserved, it’s also marked in the writings about him that he was acerbic, distant, and did not endear himself to peers. In contrast to Moltke the Elder, who had been able to a sense of familial camaraderie in the general staff, Schlieffen lacked that humanistic ability to forge bonds, and really the sense of personal character that tends to mark the great leaders in history. Per Gorlitz “ General Von Schlichting…wrote of Schlieffen that he had great strategic talent but was not a great character” (1980,129).
Schlieffen had some troubling flaws in terms of his personal leadership style. He didn’t suffer professional rivals or creative thinkers - individuals who possessed these disliked qualities tended to be relegated to the least desirable roles. Further more, he tended to be the type of individual who possessed a tunnel focus on his job so narrow that he didn’t care that others had lives beyond their jobs. He loved to assign military problems during the staffs annual rides, and it’s listed in multiple sources how Schlieffen’s Christmas Eve’s “gift” to his subordinates was a problem that they needed to solve and return to him by Christmas Day. It seems that one of his primary pleasures in this was that if he stumped someone, he took almost a mocking pleasure in it.
He also just had no joy for the world around him. He wasn’t given to taking part of the pleasures or the courts, and had no hobbies to speak of. If it wasn’t dealing with his role as Chief of the Great General Staff or part of his many war writings, he simply did not have any interest. One of the most famous examples of this is that while on a lengthy journey, his only remark on an idyllic view of the Pregel Valley was that it was an “unimportant obstacle” (Gorlitz 1980,129).
Never the less, for those that knew or heard of Schlieffen, there was a fascination and an eagerness to work with him. While he may not have had the attraction Moltke the Elder had in terms of bringing people under his wing, he still was able to grow the General Staff serving in Berlin exponentially. Its noted in Alfred Von Schlieffen’s Military Writings that when Schlieffen took office, there was less than 300 officers and men between the Staff in Berlin and those within the army’s divisions and corps, and there was less than five sections within the organization. By the time of his retirement, the General Staff had expanded to over 800, with nine sections total.
Notably, the opportunity to work under Schlieffen was one individuals actively competed for. Working under Schlieffen was synonymous with accelerating ones career path and finding their way into the promotion track sooner. He would give them extra duties, despite being new to their roles, and work his officers as hard as he did himself. Schlieffen was determined that those that worked under him would understand modern warfare - while perhaps his constant use of military problems were unpopular, they served a purpose. He was determined that those who could be future leaders would understand what it meant to be in command on the battle field. And in a real sense, this strategy was successful - “those who emerged as Imperial Germany’s best soldiers during the war…had gone through the Schlieffen School”Foley and Foley 2012, xxvii). Names such as Ludendorff, von Seeckt, Von Kuhl, Groener and von Mackensen would owe much to the learning they gained under Schlieffen.
To Be Continued
Any writing on Schlieffen is incomplete without focusing on the Schlieffen plan itself. In the following post in this series, we will explore the Schlieffen plan itself, some of its influence, and also the scholarly and historical debates on the plan itself, and whether it really did exist as a plan at all. Keep watching this page as we explore Schlieffen and his grand plan in the coming posts.
Sources:
Dupuy, Trevor N. 1977. A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
Foley, R. and Foley, R. 2012. Alfred Von Schlieffen’s Military Writings. 1st edn. New York: Frank Cass Publishers. https://www.perlego.com/book/1685468 (Accessed: 18 June 2024)
Gorlitz, Walter. 1980. History of the General Staff, 1657-1945. Boulder: Westview Press.
MacMillan, Margaret. 2014. The Road to 1914: The War that Ended Peace. New York: Random House.